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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
In-substance defeasance (ISD) is a recent financial 
innovation used by firms to extinguish debt before the due 
date specified in the debt cqntract. In an in-substance 
defeasance transaction, the firm places risk-free assets in 
an irrevocable trust in an amount sufficient to satisfy the 
cash flo~ requirements of the debt obligation. Defeased 
debt is extinguished in an economic sense from the 
borrower's standpoint, while from a legal standpoint the 
debt remains since the creditor is not satisfied. The 
defeased debt and trust assets are removed from the balance 
sheet of the debtor and an extraordinary gain or loss is 
recorded. Defeased bonds continue to trade in the market 
after the transaction date. Before ISDs were used, early 
debt extinguishment was accomplished either by satisfying 
the covenants 6f a debt contract (e.g. through call or 
sinking fund provisions) or through the early purchase of 
debt in market transactions. 
On November 29, 1983 the Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) issued Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards (SFAS) No. 76, "Extinguishment of Debt." The 
Statement allows firms to consider debt extinguished through 
an ISD, even though the firm is not legally relieved of the 
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primary obligations by the creditor. SFAS No. 76 imposes 
the following requirements for ISDs: 
(a) the debt is fixed (non-variable) as to maturity 
and interest rate, and, 
(b) the debtor places sufficient risk-free assets 
(e.g., cash or U.S. government securities) in an 
irrevocable trust solely for the purpose of 
satisfying the debt, and, 
(c) the possibility that the debtor will be required 
to make further payments is remote (FASB, 1983, 
paragraph 3c) • 
SFAS No. 76 states: 
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The Board.believes that in general, recognizing the 
effect of in-substance defeasance transactions as 
extinguishing debt is reasonable because settlement in 
cash is not always feasible and the effect of an 
in-substance defeasance is essentially the same (FASB, 
1983, paragraph 25). 
Criticism of SFAS No. 76 is based upon economic rather 
than accounting grounds. Weil (1983) dismisses the 
accounting effects as window dressing, and he protests the 
stewardship by managements .of corporations entering into an 
ISD transaction because ISDs would implicitly and explicitly 
transfer wealth from stockholders to bondholders. The 
explicit wealth transfer is accomplished by removing.assets 
from the firm and pledging them through the creation of a . 
defeasance trust for the benefit of ISD bondholders. An 
implicit wealth transfer is accomplished when the firm 
enters into a low variance, zero net present value 
investment. Moreover, Van Horne (1985) is concerned that 
firms are motivated to extinguish debt with an ISD based 
upon accounting as opposed to economic grounds. 
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The macroeconomic effect of billions in pecuniary 
(monetary) transactions is questioned by warner (1988). The 
ISD transaction, which is pecuniary, siphons off savings 
which could otherwise be invested in real investment (e.g., 
plant assets). 
The Bondholder Wealth Transfer Question 
The argument that defeased bondholders are better off 
after their bonds are defeased in an ISD transaction is 
crucial to the wealth transfer hypothesis. Peterson, 
Peterson, and Ang (1985) state the.wealth transfer 
hypothesis: 
The trust arrangement presents the potential for a 
redistribution of wealth ••. The defeased 
bondholders are net gainers in the ISD 
transaction, while the non-defeased bondholders 
and equity holders are net losers (p. 66). 
In discussing ISD transactions, Stober (1987) said: 
. . • the real empirical question is how does the 
bond market assess these transactions? ..• Is 
the final price of defeased debt significantly 
different than predicted to be if it were indeed 
perceived by the market as beirig secured without 
risk by government securities held in trust 
(p. 2)? 
Economic Substance versus Legal 
Form Question 
The FASB was persuaded by the economic substance over 
legal form arguments of ISD proponents during the discussion 
period leading up to the issuance of SFAS No. 76. An 
illustration of the divergence between accounting for the 
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presumed economic substance of an ISD transaction and its 
legal form is shown in Appendix A. Recording the accounting 
effects of an ISD transaction requires separating the firm 
and the defeasance trust. The defeased debt is removed from 
the ISD firm's liabilities and an extraordinary gain or loss 
is recorded for the difference between the carrying value of 
the defeased debt and the amount of cash or treasury 
securities placed in the defeasance trust. The interest 
expense and revenue are reported by the defeasance trust for 
financial accounting purposes. An illustration of the 
accounting treatment of an ISD transaction is shown in 
Appendix B. 
Since a legal form interpretation is taken by the 
Internal Revenue Service, the ISD transaction does not 
result in an extinguishment of debt for tax purposes, and an 
ISD does not give rise to taxable income or loss. Further, 
since the,defeasance trust is a conduit, interest expense 
and revenue are reported by the·ISD firm fo~ tax purposes. 
In summary, in-substance defeasance transactions raise 
questions about wealth transfers from stockholders to 
bondholders and among various classes of bondholders. When 
risk-free assets are placed in a defeasance trust, default 
risk is potentially reduced, thereby causing ISD bondholders 
to be better off. Also, if defeased bondholders are better 
off after an ISD, non-defeased bondholders may be worse off 
after an ISD. If bondholder wealth positions change after 
an ISD transaction, an ISD approximates an actual defeasance 
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and is substantially the same as an early debt 
extinguishment for cash. 
Statement of the Problem 
The first question examined in this dissertation is: 
Is the default risk of defeased debt significantly 
different than what would be predicted if it were 
perceived by the market as being costlessly and 
unconditionally secured without risk by government 
securities held in trust? 
This question addresses the a priori argument of 
economic substance versus legal form. Debt holders discover 
their claim has been conveyed to a trust guaranteed by risk 
free assets. There may be wealth transfer effects from 
stockholders and non-defeased bondholders to the holders of 
extinguished ISD debt. Returns should increase for a bond 
which is defeased. The returns may be the result of bond 
market recognition of a change in default risk after an ISD 
transaction. 
The question asks if observed default risk is different 
than predicted default risk for ISD bonds. Another way of 
stating the question is to ask if the default risk of ISD 
bonds is more closely associated with risky corporate debt 
or with riskless debt (i.e., government securities). 
The second question addressed in this study is: 
Does the bond market assess that default risk has 
increased for the senior bonds which are de facto 
subordinated and therefore, junior in claim to 
bonds defeased in an ISD? 
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Senior debt holders can find their claim priority 
suddenly junior to defeased debt. Their protective 
covenants were incomplete to protect them from an ISD 
transaction. There may be wealth transfer effects of going 
from senior debt to junior debt, and returns may decrease 
for a bond that is de facto subordinated but not defeased. 
The return decrease may result from non-defeased 
bondholders' recognition of a decrease in the probability of 
their. future cash flows. 
Summary of Contents 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as 
follows. Chapter II discusses relevant prior research. 
Chapter III describes the data collection procedures 
followed in this dissertation. Chapter IV presents the 
details of the research method. Chapter V contains the 
results with respect to determining the effects of ISD on 
bondholder default risk. Finally, Chapter VI concludes the 
paper and considers the implications for future research. 
CHAPTER II 
PRIOR RESEARCH 
Impact of ISD on Bondholders 
Accountants are concerned with the production of 
financial information for a variety of decision makers. 
Bondholders, because of the dollar volume of new capital 
they provide, represent one of the most important user 
groups of accounting information. Prior research in 
accounting and finance has concerned itself with the wealth 
transfer effect of ISD on holders of equity securities and 
bonds. These investigations have only weakly confirmed a 
wealth transfer effect. 
Johnson, Pari, and Rosenthal (1989) investigated the 
impact of ISD on bondholder and shareholder wealth. They 
used the NAARS data base to choose their sample of 28 firms 
with 42 ISD bond issues. Two data sources 1 were used to 
measure bond market prices and returns: (a) Merrill Lynch 
monthly bond price series were obtained for 28 of the bond 
issues identified in their sample, and (b) Moody's monthly 
bond prices were obtained for the remaining 14 issues. 
1Merrill Lynch bond data are available on magnetic tape 
and Moody's is collected by hand from printed materials. 
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Monthly holding period returns were calculated on the 
bond portfolios because.of both uncertainty regarding event 
time and thin bond trading. They used the Merrill Lynch 
long-term corporate bond index to estimate a market model 
for ISD bonds. ·Bond excess returns were significant at the 
2% level in the month of announcement for the Merrill Lynch 
subsample. However, the bond excess returns were not 
significant for the full sample which included Moody's 
prices as a data source. 
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Stockholder excess returns were not significant in the 
month of an ISD for either the Moody's subsample or the full 
sample. However, the latter results may be sensitive to the 
lack of a precise date of ISD disclosure, because groups of 
20 daily stock returns were used to measure the stockholder 
wealth transfer. 
The Merrill Lynch sample of bonds examined by Johnson, 
Pari, and Rosenthal (1989) used matrix prices. Using matrix 
pricing, if a bond does not trade, the price at which it 
would have traded is imputed from a-bond with similar 
characteristics. Nunn, Hill, and Schneeweis (1986) 
demonstrate the superiority (reduced noise) of using matrix 
bond prices over Moody's non-matrix prices when there is 
thin trading. As noted later, the bond prices used for this 
dissertation are matrix prices. 
Hand, Hughes, and Sefcik (1990) could not find 
convincing evidence of a wealth transfer from stockholders 
to bondholders. They matched monthly holding period returns 
for ISD bonds with u.s. government bonds of similar coupon 
and maturity. Hand, Hughes, and Sefcik (1990) predicted a 
6.3% bond price increase if the defeased bonds were 
perceived by investors t'o be (default) riskless. However, 
the subsample of 13 firms and 24 bonds only had an 0.84% 
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price increase. Hand, Hughes, and Sefcik (1990) assert that 
the mean actual price reaction of defeased bonds is only 
about 14% of that predicted to: have occurred if the bonds 
had been perceived as riskless. They found that while an 
ISD made the bonds less (default) risky, it did not make 
them riskless. Their results also may be sensitive to the 
problems of small sample size and the lack of a precise date 
for ISD disclosures. 
Bond Ratings Process 
There are three bond ratings agencies in the United 
States: Moody's Investor S,ervice, Standard & Poor's 
Corporation and Fitch Investors Service. The purpose of 
bond ratings is to measure default risk. 2 Moody's rates 
bonds from Aaa (highest quality) down to C (lowest quality). 
Standard & Poor's and Fitch have similar ratings. Appendix 
C shows Moody's ratings fqr public traded corporate debt. 
The degree to which ratings agencies randomly and 
continually monitor firms for changes in default risk is not 
public information. Nor is the degree to which publicly 
2This discussion follows Holthausen and Leftwich (1986, 
pp. 60-62) 0 
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available data are used in their ratings decisions. Ratings 
agencies state that the review process is a committee 
decision which includes private sources of information such 
as forecasts by management, visits to the firm's offices, 
and discussions with management. Once a rating has been 
determined, it is the rating agencies' policy to discuss the 
rating and the'reasons for the rating with the management in 
order for them to respond to it. After this discussion, the 
rating committee considers any new information. After the 
review process, the rating is made public. 
The degree of reliance or weighting that ratings 
agencies place on measurable, quantitative information such 
as audited financial statements as opposed to qualitative 
information is unknown. The agencies sell their monitoring 
services and while they are willing to make their rating 
methodology known, for propriety reasons they are reluctant 
to discuss their actual weighting of variables or decision 
criteria. 
Roy Taub, chairman of the debt rating committee at 
Standard & Poor's, said the agency would not raise the 
ratings of ISD bond issues until attorneys provide assurance 
that other corporate creditors could not obtain the 
irrevocable trust assets. So far, attorneys have been 
unwilling to provide that assurance. 
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Bond Default Risk 
Bondholder risk can be of two types according to Fisher 
(1959): (a) default risk and (b) interest rate (variability) 
risk. Default risk may be thought of as having two 
components: 
1. Pure Default Risk: Investors require a premium to 
assume the firm specific risk for their ex-ante 
expectations of the risk of default. 
2. Liquidity or Marketability Risk: Investors require 
a premium for the risk that they may not obtain a 
favorable sales price if they liquidate before 
maturity, since seasoned corporate bonds trade in 
thin markets. 
These two theoretic elements are both components of 
default risk and have positive covariance. Empirically, 
they are both included in the measurement of default risk 
assessed by bondholders. 
Summary 
This dissertation extends earlier studies by explicitly 
dealing with changes in bond default risk in the ISD 
transaction. If changes in default risk are detected for 
ISD bondholders, then the economic substance argument is 
supported. If changes in default risk are not detected, it 
can be reasoned that the bond market either does not impound 
the information that debt is extinguished in an ISD 
transaction or does not consider that the effect of an ISD 
is essentially the same as an actual or legal defeasance. 
This dissertation also extends earlier studies by explicitly 
considering the change in default risk for senior debt 
(non-defeased bonds). 
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This dissertation examines the implications of ISD on 
the economic distribution of wealth among different classes 
(defeased and non-defeased) of bondholders. This is 
accomplished by computing a measure of bondholder default 
risk--referred to as delta--and determining whether there is 
a difference in this measure of risk before and after the 
defeasance transaction. By examining one element of the 
wealth transfer hypothesis, bondholder default risk, this 
dissertation extends previous work and attempts to improve 
the understanding of the complex economic issues surrounding 
the ISD transaction. 
CHAPTER III 
THE DATA 
Sample Selection 
The sample of bonds defeased in ISD transactions and 
the related date of defeasance was initially identified with 
two searches of the National A~tomated Accounting Research 
System (NAARS) database. Key words used in the NAARS 
searches were "in-substance," "defease," (and other 
variations, e.g., defeasance), and "irrevocable." The NAARS 
sample was expanded by comparison with the samples of Press 
(1987), Deppe and Bartley (1989), and Hand, Hughes, and 
Sefcik (1989). Information contained in 10-K reports from 
Disclosure Microfiche Records was then used to verify and 
correctly classify ISDs. When a firm defeases more than one 
bond, multiple issues are accepted from the same firm. This 
process yielded a potential sample of 61 in-substance 
defeasances for 42 firms. An attempt was made to secure 
price data from Compuserve for every bond issue that met the 
following criteria: 
1. Complete Compuserve files of weekly price data 
available for all bonds; 
2. No short bond maturities or calls of less than 
one year. 
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Short maturities were eliminated from the final sample 
because assessed default risk is a function of time. Short 
maturities are assessed as having less default risk than 
long maturities for otherwise similar bonds issued by the 
same firm. 
The final sample consists of 24 ISD bonds for 15 firms. 
Table I reconciles the initial sample of in-substance 
defeased bonds to the final sample. 
Defeased bonds are grouped into portfolios by 
Moody's bond rating. While the portfolios are balanced, no 
attempt was made to accomplish this. Limited data 
availability is responsible for the final sample size. 
Table II shows the final sample of defeased bonds. 
Also, Table II shows the matched u.s. Treasury bond for each 
defeased bond. U.S. Treasury bonds are assumed to have no 
default risk. Congress has the authority to issue money to 
settle its debt. 
As stated in Chapter II, seasoned corporate bonds trade 
in thin (less liquid) markets, whereas seasoned U.S. 
treasury bonds are traded in thick (more liquid) markets. 
Bond prices have been shown to be influenced by thin 
trading. Nunn, Hill, and Schneeweis (1986) demonstrated the 
superiority of matrix prices over the usual source of bond 
prices and yields, namely, monthly quotes from Moody's, or 
Standard & Poor's. Using matrix pricing, if a bond does not 
trade, the price it would have traded at is inputed from a 
bond with similar characteristics. It is possible that 
Johnson, Pari, and Rosenthal (1987) and Hand, Hughes, and 
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Sefcik (1990) obtained conflicting results because matrix 
prices were used in the former, whereas Moody's prices were 
used in the latter. 
TABLE I 
RECONCILIATION OF TEST PORTFOLIOS 
ISD Portfolios 
Initial sample 
Number of firms excluded because of 
incomplete market information 
Number of firms whose ISDs mature or 
are called within one year 
Final ISD Sample 
Non-ISD Portfolios 
Initial sample 
Number of firms excluded because of 
incomplete market information 
Final Non-ISD Sample 
Total 
Firms 
42 
<21> 
<6> 
15 
15 
<5> 
10 
Total 
ISD Bonds 
61 
<29> 
<8> 
24 
17 
<7> 
10 
16 
TABLE II 
SAMPLE OF DEFEASED BONDS - DURATION MATCHING 
PORTFOLIO ISD BONDS Aaa Moody's Bond Rating at Defeasance 
Bond Maturity D1 u.s. Treasury Bond D1 
Exxon 1997 8.08 7 1993-98 8.10 
Exxon 1998 8.03 7 1993-98 8.10 
ARCO 1988 4.44 8 1/4 1990 4.85 
Amer Pres Lines 1990 5.19 7 1/4 1992 5.84 
Amer Pres Lines 1991 5.18 7 1/4 1992 5.84 
PORTFOLIO ISD BONDS A a Moody's Bond Rating at Defeasance 
Bond Maturity D1 u.s. Treasury Bond D1 
General Mills 1995 7.09 7 1993-98 7.07 
Ralston Purina 1988 4.24 8 1/4 1990 4.01 
General Mills 1999 7.56 7 ?/8 1995-00 7.67 
Shell Oil Co. 1992 5.82 9 1994 5.92 
Shell Oil Co. 2000 7.90 10 3/4 2003 7.93 
Shell Oil Co. 2002 8.37 10 2010 8.43 
Shell Oil Co. 2007 8.73 11 3/4 2009-16 8.81 
PORTFOLIO ISD BONDS Baa Moody's Bond Rating at Defeasance 
Bond 
Houston Nat. Gas 
usx 
usx 
Montgomery Ward 
Carter Hawley 
Cinn Gas & Elec 
Maturity 
1992 
1996 
2001 
1990 
2008 
1992 
D1 
5.59 
7.68 
8.04 
3.41 
9.32 
4.37 
u.s. Treasury Bond 
7 1/4 1992 
12 3/8 2004 
11 1/8 2003 
12 3/8 1991 
13 7/8 2006-11 
11 3/4 1992 
D1 
5.68 
7.52 
8.15 
3.41 
9.27 
4.12 
PORTFOLIO ISD BONDS NR Moody's Bond Rating at Defeasance 
Bond 
Crane Co. 
United Airlines 
Marine Midland 
Marine Midland 
Fremont General 
Fremont General 
Maturity 
1992 
1992 
1994 
2003 
1992 
1990 
D1 
5.33 
6.61 
6.30 
8.01 
3.61 
7.49 
U.S. Treasury Bond 
7 1/4 1992 
6 3/4 1993 
9 1994 
10 3/4 2003 
11 3/4 1992 
7 1/2 1988-93 
D1 
5.38 
6.49 
5.92 
7.93 
5.08 
7.81 
-
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This dissertation uses industrial and U.S. Treasury 
weekly matrix bond prices obtained from Compuserve for a 
fifty-two week period before and a fifty-two week period 
after the ISD event date. Compuserve matrix bond prices are 
limited to the issues which are widely traded by 
institutional investors. 
Bonds listed by Compuserve generally have the 
attributes of high credit quality and marketability. Using 
Compuserve as a data source has two impqrtant implications 
for the proposed study: (1) matrix prices compensate for 
the bias introduced by ~thin trading," and (2) because the 
bond price data are transmitted in electronic magnetic form, 
there is less likelihood of clerical errors in recording 
bond price data. 
A similar process as described above was used to 
identify the sample of non-ISD bonds which were made junior 
by a senior ISD bond. The initial search yielded seventeen 
bonds for fifteen companies. Applying Criteria 1 and 2 
above yields a final sample of ten bonds for ten companies. 
Table I reconciles the initial sample of non-ISD bonds to 
the final sample, and Table III shows the final sample of 
non-defeased bonds. The data are grouped into two 
portfolios based upon Moody's bond rating. It was necessary 
to combine the Aaa and Aa bonds because of data 
availability. 
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TABLE III 
SAMPLE OF NON-DEFEASED BONDS 
PORTFOLIO NONISD Aaa & Aa Moody's Bond Rating at Defeasance 
Bond Maturity D1 u.s. Treasury Bond D1 
ARCO 1997 8.46 7 1998 8.13 
Arner Pres Lines 1990 ?.48 .7 1/4 1992 7.25 
Shell Oil Co. 2005 8.41 8 ·~I 4 2005 8.66 
General Mills 1999 8.00 8 2001 8.16 
Ralston Purina 1996 7.14 7 7/8 2000 6.87 
PORTFOLIO NONISD Baa Moody's. Bond Rating at Defeasance 
Bond Maturity D1 u.s. Treasury Bond D1 
Burlington Ind. 1995 6.33 10 3/8 1995 6.55 
Eastern Edison 1993 6.57 7 1/4 1992 5.90 
Crane Company 1993 5.61 7 1/4 1992 5.77 
Fremont General 1995 6.04 .11 1/2 1995 6.39 
Montgomery Ward 2000 7.78 8 1/2 1999 7.36· 
Duration Matching Treasury Bonds 
The bond investor purchases a specific promise of 
future interest and principal payments. The purchase price 
of the bond is conceptually the present value of the 
promises discounted at the current market interest rate. 
This rate is influenced by market rates but also includes a 
premium for the risks assumed. The promises are fixed as to 
amount, but the market value of the promise varies with two 
risks that the investor must bear. In this section, 
measures are discussed which control for interest rate 
elasticity and therefore allow for an examination of default 
risk associated with an ISD. 
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As noted in Chapter II, these risks are default risk 
and interest rate risk (Fisher, 1959). Default risk was 
discussed in Chapter II. It is an endogenous, firm specific 
risk that the issuer will be unable to make interest and 
principal payments as agreed. Interest rate risk is an 
exogenous, market risk that interest rates will change 
during the holding period. Duration is a measure of 
interest rate risk. It is the average length of time over 
which a bond promises interest and principal payments, 
including any early repayment of principal. Duration is 
measured as an index which is the present value-weighted 
average maturity of the bond in which time periods of both -
interest coupon and principal receipt dates are separately 
discounted (Francis, 1986). 
Hopewell and Kaufman (1973) showed that bonds with high 
levels of interest rate risk (duration) have more volatile 
prices than bonds with less interest rate risk (duration). 
Anything which causes a bond's duration to increase (such as 
longer maturity and/o~ lower coupon interest rate) also 
increases a bond's interest rate risk. 
The control for interest rate risk used in this 
dissertation is to match risky corporate and riskless 
government bonds as closely as possible based upon 
calculated D1, Macaulay's duration. Bierwag (1977) states 
that duration is important in the construction of bond 
portfolios that are hedged against interest rate risk. 
Macaulay's duration, D1, was calculated for each of the 
bonds in the original sample of ISD bonds. The standard 
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Macaulay duration measure, as shown in Broske (1982), can be 
calculated as follows: 
T t pt 
~ 
t=l (1 + rt )t 
Dl= 
T pt 
~ 
t=l (1 + rt) t 
Where 
Dl = the Macaulay duration measure 
P = payment of interest or principal at time t 
t 
t = the amount of time before the cash flow (P) is 
received 
T = the final maturity of the financial contract 
r = current market interest rates for the security 
under consideration -
A Fortran program was written to calculate the 
durations, a copy of which is included as Appendix D. A 
sample of U.S. Treasury bonds with prices available on 
(1) 
Compuserve was obtained and matched as closely as possible 
to ISO bonds on the basis of calculated duration Dl. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHOD 
This dissertation examines investors' market responses 
to changes in default risk associated with an in-substance 
defeasance transaction. The dissertation examines the 
implications of an ISD on the economic distribution of 
wealth among different classes (defeased and non-defeased) 
of bondholders. This is accomplished by computing a measure 
of bondholder default risk, delta, explained in the 
following section. Delta is measured before, during, and 
after the date of the defeasance transaction. By examining 
one element of the wealth transfer hypothesis, bondholder 
default risk, this dissertation ,explores an important issue 
regarding the ISD transaction. One important element of 
bondholders' assessments of the necessary default risk 
premium is default costs. Kim, McConnell, and Greenwood 
(1977) conclude that the risks that bondholders bear are 
important because they have no managerial control until a 
firm actually defaults on interest or principal obligations. 
Baker (1984) points out that an inverse relationship exists 
between bond credit rating and pre-tax cost of an ISD. The 
smaller the spread between corporate bonds and government 
bonds, the smaller the potential wealth transfer effect. 
The ISD transaction may influence investors to alter their 
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assessment of the bond's default risk. Default costs will 
reduce the amount of cash flows available to pay interest 
and principal in the event of default. Some of the costs 
include information, contracting, and policing costs as 
described by Demsetz (1964). Default cost estimates are 
responsible for a difference between returns of risky and 
risk-free bonds. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that debt 
gives rise to incentive problems and agency costs. The 
investor's assessment of default premium!will determine how 
close to the returns of the risk-free assets that the. 
defeased bond trades. 
Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 
This dissertation uses moving second degree stochastic 
dominance methodology (SDSD) which is less sensitive to a 
precise event date of ISD disclosure than is the market 
model. The market model has been used by other researchers, 
as discussed in Chapter II. Moreover, SDSD methodology has 
been used in other accounting research studies involving the 
ranking of probability distributions. For example, it has 
been used to compare the frequency distribution of returns 
on two or more populations of marketable securities, the 
distribution of errors from two or more estimation 
techniques, the utility functions of financial information 
users, and the error occurrence under two or more different 
internal control systems. Ordering such distributions using 
SDSD is superior to the use of traditional mean-variance 
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analysis because the latter may not result in a conclusive 
ranking when the distribution with the preferable mean value 
also has a higher variance. It also does not allow for a 
prediction with a known upward or downward bias which might 
be preferable to an unbiased prediction that could err in 
either direction. In addition, mean-variance analysis 
assumes a normally distributed population, an assumption 
which does not hold in many accounting research 
applications. 
Levy and Sarnat (1984) outline the theoretical 
framework for studies seeking evidence of a market reaction 
to a broad set of transactions (e.g., an ISD transaction). 
Second Degree Stochastic Dominance (SDSD) provides a 
conclusive ranking for probability distributions. This is 
an optimal efficiency criterion which produces the smallest 
possible efficient set for all risk-averse investors. 
Stochastic dominance theory is based on the von Neumann-
Morgenstern axioms of expected utility. The utility 
function characteristics are expressed in terms of the 
derivatives of an investor's utility of wealth function with 
respect to a change in return. First-degree stochastic 
dominance requires u'~ 0; second-degree, u'~ 0, u''< 0; and 
third degree, u'~ 0, u' '< 0, and u'' '> 0, where u is a 
utility function. 
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Second Degree Stochastic Dominance 
(SDSD) Rule 
Let F and G denote the cumulative distributions of the 
returns of two investm~nts. Then F dominates G by SDSD (for 
all risk-averse investors) if and only if for every return 
value R, 
J -~ [G(t) - F(t)]dt > 0 ( 2) 
and a strict inequality is observed at least for one R. 
Methodology: Delta-Measure of 
Default Risk 
Let Fa(x) be the cumulative probability distribution of 
the rates of return on investment in ISD bonds, where x is 
the rate of return; similarly, Frr(x) is the cumulative 
probability distribution for U.S. government securities. By 
using SDSD, the cumulative probability distribution Fa 
should be observed to dominate Frr and therefore Fa would be 
preferred by all risk-averse investors; however, ISD bonds 
possess greater default risk t.han U.S. government 
securities. The technique to be used involves shifting the 
Fa distribution by iterative application of estimates of 
default probability in a systematic manner until the 
dominance exactly disappears. The final adjustment, which 
' 
is called delta, may be interpreted as a measure of the 
premium for default as perceived by the bond market when 
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comparing an ISD bond with the riskless government 
securities. 
Following Broske (1985), delta is defined in such a way 
that its incorporation in the distribution of the riskier 
asset would result in the risk-averse investor being 
indifferent between the two assets, and thus, dominance 
would disappear. The Fa distribution is transformed to an 
Fa' distribution by incorporating the market estimate of 
default until the dominance of Fa over Fn exactly 
disappears. In other words, the Fa distribution is changed 
to Fa' until: 
x [ F n ( t) - Fa ' ( t)] d t < 0 J- 00 
for at least one value of x. The economic foundation of 
stochastic dominance uses the application of the stochastic 
dominance criteria in deriving a technique to quantify the 
probability of default. Default results in a zero return to 
the bondholder. The return, if default results in zero 
return to the ISD bondholder, can be expressed as: 
0 if default occurs 
ERa = { 
ER if there is no default 
where ERa is the expected value of the ex-post distribution 
of returns on the ISD bonds. 
By including the probability of default delta (o) -
(a return of zero), the ISD bond return can be expressed as: 
ERa = [ o(O) + (1-o) Ea(x)] (3) 
By setting the expected return on the ISD bonds (ERa) 
equal to the expected return on the government securities 
(ERn) so that the risk-averse investor is indifferent 
between the two assets, one can solve for the value of 
delta: 
ERa = [8(0) + (1-8) Ea(x)] 
8 = 1 - ERTI (X) 
Ea (x) 
= ER TI(X) 
The Broske algorithm is shown in Appendix E. The 
( 4) 
( 5) 
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application of the Broske algorithm results in deltas which 
are, in the context of this dissertation, the market's 
estimate of the probability of default of an ISD bond 
relative to a government security. 
This dissertation uses an extension of this algorithm 
by Jadlow (1991) which calculates the change in delta over 
time using a moving stochastic dominance procedure (MSDSD). 
The MSDSD deltas over time should show whether the market 
assesses a declining risk premium to bonds that have been 
defeased in an ISD transaction. Jadlow used an MSDSD to 
examine the Eurodollar default risk over time. 
Delta can assume a value between zero and one. Smaller 
values of delta are interpreted as measuring less default 
risk that higher values of delta. If a bond portfolio has a 
delta of zero, this result is interpreted to mean that 
investors believe it is equivalent in default risk to a 
portfolio of U.S. government securities. This 
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interpretation assumes that the two portfolios are similar 
in all other relevant investment attributes (e.g. duration). 
A Fortran program was written to calculate the MSDSD 
deltas, a copy of which is included as Appendix F. Weekly 
holding period returns were calculated for U.S. Treasury 
bonds and duration matched ISD bonds and non-ISD bonds. 
These were combined into portfolios based upon the bond 
ratings of the ISD and non-ISD bonds. These portfolio 
returns were inputs to the Fortran program which calculated 
MSDSD deltas shown as results reported in Chapter V. 
For the purpose of analysis, 104 weekly time series 
observations representing two event time years' matched ISD-
and U.S. Government bond portfolio returns, are taken six at 
a time, and the delta for that six-week period calculated. 
For the next six-week period, the initial observation is 
incremented by three weeks and the calculation of delta 
repeated. This process yields 33 overlapping deltas over 
the two-year time period. Each delta quantifies default 
risk for a period of six weeks. 
Statistical Measures 
The first question is concerned with wealth transfers 
to bondholders when their bonds are defeased. Do 
bondholders act as if the in-substance defeasance 
transaction provides them with a bond which is free of 
default risk? Default risk, as measured by moving 
stochastic dominance deltas, is tested by calculating the 
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t-statistic. The t-statistic used to test the first 
question for portfolios of ISD bonds is a measure of the 
statistical distance of a calculated mean of bond portfolio 
deltas compared to an expectation of delta. To test the 
first question, the null hypothesis is: the calculated mean 
of post-defeasance deltas is equal to zero for each 
portfolio tested. Rejection of the null hypothesis suggests 
that investors believe that defeased bonds are not free of 
default risk. 
The second question is concerned with wealth transfer 
from bondholders when their bonds are not defeased. Do 
bondholders act as if an in-substance defeasance 
transaction, by rearranging the claims structure of 
bondholders of the same firm, converts their bond to a lower 
priority or junior claim relative to defeased bonds? If 
non-defeased bondholders believe that their bonds have lower 
priority in a firm's claim structure, this should result in 
an upward revision of their assessment of default risk. If 
delta is observed to increase, then the second question is 
tested by calculating the t-statistic for the difference in 
the means of post-defeasance deltas of non-defeased bonds 
relative to pre-defeasance deltas. 
CHAPTER V 
FINDINGS 
Results of MSDSD Tests--ISD Portfolios 
As shown in Table I, the sample of defeased bonds is 
grouped into four portfolios. The first portfolio consists 
of the Aaa rated bonds, i.e., bonds with the highest Moody's 
rating and the lowest default risk. The other three 
portfolios have a Moody's rating of Aa, Baa, and NR, 
representing progressively declining Moody's ratings and 
increasing default risk. 
The first question addre~sed in the dissertation is 
whether the default risk of defeased debt is significantly 
different than what would be predicted if it were perceived 
by the market as being costlessly and unconditionally 
secured without risk by government securities held in trust. 
In other words, SFAS No. 76 predicted that default risk of 
defeased debt should be zero. The bondholders' assessment 
of default risk in the post-defeasance period will provide 
an answer to the question of substance over form. If ISD 
bondholders are made better off as a result of an ISD, one 
should observe deltas that decrease to zero in the 
post-defeasance event time. If bondholders believe that 
their bonds are made default risk free, one would expect 
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that mean deltas should decrease to approximately zero for 
the period following a defeasance transaction. 
Table IV presents the results of t-tests on the means 
of deltas 
The right 
the first 
Portfolio 
Aaa 
A a 
Baa 
NR 
in event time as pre-ISD and post-ISD event dates. 
side of Table IV shows the results of t-tests on 
question described above. 
TABLE IV 
PORTFOLIOS OF IN-SUBSTANCE DEFEASED BONDS 
T-STATISTICS FOR THE MEANS OF PORTFOLIOS 
PRE-ISD AND POST-ISD PERIODS 
AROUND THE EVENT DATE 
Pre-ISD Period Post-ISD Period 
Mean Delta t-Statistic Mean Delta t-Statistic 
Std. Dev. Prob > It I Std. Dev. Prob 2. It I 
.40 2.52 .18 1. 83 
(.28) n.s. (. 17) n.s. 
(2 d. f.) (2 d. f.) 
.16 1. 35 .21 2.21 
(. 21) n.s. (. 16) n.s. 
(2 d. f.) (2 d. f.) 
.46 3.86 .53 5.91 
(. 2 7) .01 (. 2 0) 0.005 
(4 d. f.) (4 d. f.) 
.15 1. 45 .51 4.37 
(. 21) n.s. (. 23) 0.025 
(3 d. f.) (3 d. f.) 
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Mean deltas for the Aaa and Aa portfolios are not 
significantly different from zero in both the post- and 
pre-defeasance periods. Generally speaking, the ISD 
transaction does not appear to affect default risk for these 
two portfolios. However, Aaa and Aa bonds have the highest 
bond ratings and already possess low default risk. Thus it 
may be difficult to measure the effect of an ISD transaction 
on bonds that are approximately riskless in the first place. 
The t-tests of the observed post-ISD mean deltas for the Baa 
and NR portfolios are significant at an alpha level of .05 
or lower. The significant results for the Baa and NR 
portfolios are not as predicted and allow the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of a zero default risk after defeasance 
for the two portfolios with the lowest bond ratings. Taken 
overall, the results for all four portfolios do not support 
the wealth transfer hypothesis. 
Figures,l through 4 graphically present the delta 
values for the four portfolios during the pre- and 
post-defeasance periods. In general, visual inspection of 
Figures 1 to 4 supports the statistical tests reported in 
Table IV. 
Results of MSDSD Tests--Non ISD Portfolios 
Question 2 addresses the issue of whether default risk 
has increased for the senior bonds which are made junior in 
claim to bonds defeased in an in-substance defeasance. Two 
portfolios of bonds which were made junior to an ISD bond as 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0 
~ 0.5 Ill 
0 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
-50 -30 -10 0 10 30 
Event Time in Weeks 
Figure 1. Moving SDSD Aaa ISD Bonds Portfolio 
w 
N 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0 
~ 0.5 Ill 
0 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0. 1 
0 
-so -30 -10 0 10 30 
Event Time in Weeks 
Figure 2. Moving SDSD Aa ISD Bonds Portfolio 
w 
w 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0 
±:: 0.5 Q) 
0 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0.1 
0 
-50 -30 -10 0 10 30 
[oJent Time in Weeks 
Figure 3. Moving SDSD Baa ISD Bonds Portfolio 
1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0 
.... 0.5 Qi 
0 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
.I 
0.1 
0 
-50 -30 -10 0 10 30 
Event Time in Weeks 
Figure 4. Moving SDSD NR ISD Bonds Portfolio 
50 
w 
Ul 
36 
a result of the ISO are examined to answer Question 2. The 
two non-defeased bond portfolios have a Moody's rating of 
Aaa, Aa (grouped together), and Baa. The data are 
classified into two portfolios based upon Moody's bond 
ratings. It is necessary to combine the Aaa and Aa bonds 
because of limited data availability. 
If default risk increases in the post-defeasance period 
relative to pre-defeasance period, then the difference 
between post- and pre-defeasance deltas should be greater 
than zero. Mean deltas for the two portfolios during the 
two periods are reported in Table V. Contrary to the 
relationship hypothesized in Question 2, the mean deltas do 
not increase. The mean of deltas for the Aaa/Aa 
non-defeasance portfolio decrease from .46 in pre-defeasance 
to .23 in the post-defeasance period. Similarly, the Baa 
non-defeasance portfolio mean deltas decrease from .49 in 
the pre-defeasance period to .25 in the post-defeasance 
period. Visual inspection of Figures 5 and, 6 also shows a 
pattern of lower deltas after defeasance. Given this it is 
unnecessary to conduct statistical tests, a~ outlined 
I 
earlier. No support is found for the view that non-ISD 
bondholders are harmed as a result of an ISD transaction. 
TABLE V 
PORTFOLIOS OF NON-DEFEASED BONDS MEANS OF PORTFOLIOS 
PRE-ISD AND POST-ISD PERIODS AROUND 
THE EVENT DATE 
Pre-ISD Period Post-ISD Period 
Portfolio Mean Delta Mean Delta 
Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 
Aaa-Aa-Non .46 .23 
(. 31) ( . 15) 
Baa-Non .49 .25 
(. 18) (. 20) 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
Discussion of Results 
The first question addressed in this dissertation is 
whether the default risk of defeased debt is significantly 
different than what would be predicted if it were perceived 
by the market as being costlessly and unconditionally 
secured without risk by government securities held in trust. 
In other words, SFAS No. 76 predicts that default risk of 
defeased debt should be zero. The bondholders• assessment 
of default risk in the post-defeasance period provide~ an 
answer to the question of substance over form. This 
dissertation extends earlier studies by explicitly dealing 
with changes in bond default risk in the ISD transaction. 
The results for the Aaa and Aa portfolios indicate that the 
ISD transaction does not appear to change perceived default 
risk. In both the pre- and post-defeasance periods, the 
default risk measure, delta, is not significantly different 
from zero. For the Baa and NR portfolios, the defeasance 
transaction does not appear to have reduced default risk to 
approximately zero. The view that an ISD is economically 
like an actual defeasance is not supported for these two 
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portfolios. Overall, the results for all four portfolios do 
not support the wealth transfer hypothesis. 
The second question is concerned with wealth transfers 
from bondholders when their bonds are not defeased. Do 
bondholders act as if an in-substance defeasance 
transaction, by rearranging the claims structure of 
bondholders of the same firm, converts their bonds to a 
lower priority- or junior claim relative to the defeased 
bonds? If non-defeased bondholders believe that their bonds 
have a lower priority in a firm's claim structure, this 
should result in an upward revision of their assessment of 
default risk. This dissertation also extends earlier 
studies by explicitly considering the change in default risk 
for such senior debt (non-defeased bonds). The non-defeased 
bondholders' assessment of default risk in the 
post-defeasance period provides an answer to the question of 
claim priority after defeasance. The results show that 
defeasance does not result'in increases of assessed default 
risk for non-defeased bondholders. No evidence is found 
that 'non-ISD bondholders are harmed as a ·result of an ISD 
transaction. 
Implications 
The results reported here do not support the view that 
defeased bondholders received a permanent wealth transfer as 
a result of the in-substance defeasance transaction. These 
findings tend to support previous investigations of the ISD 
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transaction by Johnson, Pari, and Rosenthal (1989) and Hand, 
Hughes, and Sefcik (1990). The findings have an implication 
for accounting policy makers: the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board may have a basis to reexamine SFAS No. 76. 
The argument of substance over form that persuaded the FASB 
to issue SFAS No. 76 is not supported by the results of this 
dissertation or the research reported above. 
The implications of the findings for Question 2 are 
that since non-defeased bondholders are not found to be 
worse off after an ISO, they do not find it necessary to 
protect themselves from ISO. The fear of negative wealth 
transfers which may result from incomplete protection debt 
covenants is not supported ,by the results of this 
dissertation. 
Limitations 
Default risk as assessed by bondholders depends upon 
the specific conditions that exist in the economy. Default 
risk is not stable over time but changes with events that 
alter investor expectations: economic conditions and 
expectations of future economic conditions (e.g., business 
cycles) influence default risk. The event period in this 
dissertation is 1981 to 1986, which includes both economic 
recession and expansion.. A limitation of the experimental 
design of this dissertation is that the effect of the 
business cycle on default risk has not been explicitly 
controlled. 
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The small sample of in-substance defeasance bonds 
available limits the ability to genera+ize these results to 
other classes of liabilities extinguished with in-substance 
defeasance transactions. The results of this dissertation 
suggest the need for further research examining the effects 
of the in-substance defeasance transaction on a broader 
class of liabilities. 
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APPENDIX A 
IN-SUBSTANCE DEFEASANCE TRANSACTION 
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ISO FIR" ISO TRUST 
1. Cash or U.S. governtent tarket- 1. Trust executes agreetent w1th 
able securities 1s placed In firl and rece1ves cash or U.S. 
trust. govern1ent tarketable securities 
to sat1sfy cash flow requ1re1ents 
of the defeased obligation. 
2. Long or short-ter• f1xed Interest 
rate debt with a def1n1te 1atur1ty 
1s decreased by the carry1ng value 2. Trust earns Interest on assets 
of the defeased obligation. and pays Interest on defeased 
obligation. Trust also pays 
pr1nc1pal or s1nk1ng fund 
paytents as or1g1nally scheduled 
3. Extraordinary ga1n recorded for the 
difference between 1 and 2 above. 
3. Trust 1s a condu1t for Incote 
Tax purposes and does not create 
a potential taxable event unt1l 
4. Deferred tax Increases by an a1ount the aatur1ty date of the defeased 
equal to the est11ate of the tax obl1gat1on. 
liability on the difference between 
steps 1 and 2. 
!tax decrease 1f loss; ga1n assutedl 
5. Net Incote for the per1od Increases 
by the atount of the difference 
between 3 and 4. 
(net 1nco1e will decrease If lossl 
6. Reta1ned earnings Increase by an 
atount equal to step 5. 
Adapted fro11 Ph1ll1ps and ~ody 119891 p. 3G-31. 
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ACCOUNTING FOR THE ISD TRANSACTION 
An example will illustrate the accounting for an ISD 
transaction: A firm issues $1 million, 20-year, 5% bonds 
for par on January 1, 1972. On January 1, 1982, the market 
rate for 10-year bonds in the firm's risk class is 12%. 
U.S. Government 5% bonds with a 10-year maturity are 
yielding 10%. The present value of the original bond issue 
is $598,553. U.S. Government bonds which will service the 
firm's debt can be purchased for $688,444. If the firm 
enters into an ISD transaction on December 31, 1981, the 
government bonds are transferred to an irrevocable trust to 
service the firm's 20-year, 5% bonds of 1992. The income 
statement will show an extraordinary $311,556 pre-tax gain 
for the period. The balance sheet will no longer reflect 
the $1 million debt or trust assets because they have been 
offset. 
The $401,447 ($1 million- $598,553) is a bondholder's 
unrealized economic loss and a shareholder's unrealized 
economic gain which the firm would report if it repurchased 
the bonds. 
The $89,891 ($401,447 - $311,556) of unrecognized 
economic gain that retirement by defeasance transfers from 
the shareholders back to the bondholders is troublesome. 
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MOODY'S BOND RATINGS 
The following is quoted from Moody's Bond Record 
(1982): 
Aaa 
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Bonds which are rated Aaa are judged to be of the best 
quality. They carry the smallest degree of investment risk 
and are generally referred to as "gilt edge." Interest 
payments are protected by a large or by an exceptionally 
strong margin and principal is secure. While the various 
protective elements are likely to change, such changes as 
can be visualized are most unlikely to impair the 
fundamentally strong position of such issues. 
A a 
Bonds which are rated Aa are judged to be of high 
quality by all standards. Together with the Aaa group 
comprise what are generally know as high grade bonds. 
are rated lower than the best bonds because margins of 
protection may not be as large as in Aaa securities or 
fluctuation of protective elements may be of greater 
amplitude or there may be other elements present which 
the long term risks appear somewhat larger than in Aaa 
securities. 
A 
they 
They 
make 
Bonds which are rated A possess many favorable 
investment attributes and are to be considered as upper 
medium grade obligations. Factors giving security to 
principal and interest are considered adequate but elements 
may be present which suggest a susceptibility to impairment 
sometime in the future. 
Baa 
Bonds which are rated Baa are considered as medium 
grade obligations, i.e., they are neither highly protected 
nor poorly secured. Interest payments and principal 
security appear adequate for the present but certain 
protective elements may be lacking or may be 
characteristically unreliable over any great length of 
time. Such bonds lack outstanding investment 
characteristics and in fact have speculative characteristics 
as well. 
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Ba 
Bonds which are rated Ba are judged to have speculative 
elements; their future cannot be considered as well assured. 
Often the protection of interest and principal payments may 
be very moderate and thereby not well safeguarded during 
both good and bad times over the future. Uncertainty of 
position characterizes bonds in this class. 
B 
Bonds which are rated B generally lack characteristics 
of the desirable investment. Assurance of interest and 
principal payments or of maintenance of other terms of the 
contract over any long period of time may be small. 
Caa 
Bonds which are rated Caa are of poor standing. Such 
issues may be in default or there may be present elements of 
danger with respect to principal or interest. 
Ca 
Bonds which are rated Ca represent obligations which 
are speculative in a high degree. Such issues are often in 
default or have other marked shortcomings. 
c 
Bonds which are rated C are the lowest rated class of 
bonds and issues so rated can be regarded as having 
extremely poor prospects of ever attaining any real 
investment standing. 
NR 
Indicates that no rating has been requested, that there 
is insufficient information on which to base a rating, or 
that Moody's does not rate a particular type of obligation 
as a matter of policy. 
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FORTRAN PROGRAM TO CALCULATE BOND DURATION D1 
WRITE (6,895) 
895 FORMAT (///,6X,'CASE COUPON YRSTOMAT MATVAL YTM 
1 PERIOD D1 I ') 
NC=49. 
DO 300 I=1,NC 
10 FORMAT (1X,I3,3X,F6.2,3X,F8.2,3X,F6.4,3X,I2) 
READ (5,10) ICASE,COU,TIME,VM,R,M 
X1=(1+R/M)**(TIME*M+1) 
X2=(1+R/M)+R*TIME 
X3=(R/M)**2 
X4=(VM)*TIME*M 
X5=(X3*X4) 
X6=COU*R/M 
X7=(1+(R/M))**(TIME*M) 
X8=X6*(X7-1) 
X9=VM*X3 
DU1=(COU*(X1-X2)+X5)/(X8+X9) 
DUR=DU1/M 
WRITE (6,904) 
904 FORMAT(//) 
WRITE (6,908) ICASE,COU,TIME,VM,R,M,DUR 
908 FORMAT(6X,I3,4X,F5.2,1X,F5.1,6X,F6.0,1X,F5.4, 
1 3X,I2,1X,F9.4) 
300 CONTINUE 
STOP 
END 
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AN ALGORITHM FOR CALCULATING THE PROBABILITY 
OF DEFAULT WHEN THERE ARE N INTERSECTIONS 
BETWEEN THE CUMULATIVE PROBABILITY DISTRIBUTIONS 
For discrete distributions, as noted above, it is only necessary to check the 
points of intersection. This is the basis for developing the algorithm. For 
purpose of analysis, assume two discrete cumulative probability distribu-
tions of a given variable, which we call Fx·(x) and Fv(y), where X' has 
default risk and Y does not, and proceed as follows: 
1. Order (rank) the observations of the given variable for X' and then 
for Y from the smallest value to the largest. 
2. As X' is defined as having some probability of default, we know that 
it contains some implied level of delta. As we have discrete distribu-
tions, the cumulative probability at any point can be written as an 
interval as follows: 
0 O<p::53 
X~ a < p ::5 [ (1 -a>(~) + 8 J 
x2 [(1-8)(~) +8] <p::5 [2(1-8)(~) +8] 
x' = [2(1-8)(~) +8] <p::5 [3(1-8)(~) +8] X~ 
x~ [<n-l)(l-8)(~)+8]<p::5l, 
where n is the number of observations, and all observations are 
assigned the same probability 1/n. 
y, 0 < p ::5 (~) 
Y2 (~) < p ::5 (~) 
y= Yl (~) < p ::5 (~) 
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3. Calculate (y- x') for each change in probability. Call these areas, 
1, ... , 2n. Formulas for each area (y- x') follow: 
1. (y.- 0)8. 
2. (y 1 - x;)(~- 8 ). 
3. (y2-xD{[(~)(l-8)+8] -(;)}. 
4. (y2- x2>{ (~) - [ (;)o- 8) +a]}. 
2n-l (yn-X~n-ll>[(n: 1)(1-8)+8] -(n: 1). 
2n. (yn-x~){~- [<n: l) (1-8)+8]}. 
4. Begin with a large value for 8 (so that YDX' by SSD) and reduce it 
until the cumulative difference is no longer greater than zero (i.e., 
until exact SSD results and any further reduction in 8 would result 
in X'DY). 
Before presenting the algorithm, it is necessary to define the following 
variables: 
a,= (y,+l- x:>[ a( I - ~)]. i = 0, 1, ... , n - I, (A2.l) 
[J~ (i-1 )] ~. = (y, - x:) ~ + 8 -n-- 1 , i = I, ... , n, (A2.2) 
ljl, = a, + ~ .. i = 0, 1, ... , n. (A2.3) 
The following two rules must hold for the delta which results in precise SSD: 
Rule 1 for alii; (A2.4) 
I 
Rule 2 L ljl,- a,;;:: 0 for all i. (A2.5) 
o=l 
Source: Broske (1985), pp. 142-143. 
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FORTRAN PROGRAM TO CALCULATE DELTA 
REAL*8 X(1000),Y(1000),YS(0:100),XS(100),DELT,DELTI 
INTEGER*4 N,PASS,OUT,GET DEVICE 
OUT = GET DEVICE () -
10 WRITE(6,*)'PLEASE ENTER DELTA AND DELTA DECREMENT ' 
READ(S,*)DELTA,DECREMENT 
* 
WRITE(6,*) 'PLEASE ENTER THE STEP SIZE ' 
READ(S,*)N 
PASS = 1 
M=1 
I = N 
CALL INPUT(X,Y,NUM,OUT) 
DO WHILE(I.LE.NUM) 
DELT = DELTA 
DELTI = DECREMENT 
YS(O) = O.DO 
DO J=1,N 
XS(J) = X(J+M-1) 
YS(J) = Y(J+M-1) 
END DO 
CALL SORTER (XS) 
CALL SORTER ( YS) 
CALL CALCULATE(OUT,PASS,YS,XS,N,DELT,DELTI) 
PASS = PASS + 1 
I = I + N/2 
M = M + N/2 
END DO 
CALL CONTTNUE 
GOTO 10 
END 
SUBROUTINE INPUT(X,Y,NUM,OUT) 
REAL*8 X(1000),Y(1000) 
CHARACTER*8 FILENAME 
INTEGER*4 NUM,IOS,OUT 
WRITE(6,*) 'ENTER THE NAME OF FILE TO READ: ' 
READ(S,' (A) ')FILENAME 
CALL HEADER(FILENAME,OUT) 
OPEN(S,FILE=FILENAME,IOSTAT=IOS) 
REWIND 8 
NUM = 0 
DOWHILE(IOS.NE.-1) 
61 
READ(8,' (4X,F8.0,1X,F8.0) ',IOSTAT=IOS)X(NUM+1),Y(NUM+1) 
NUM = NUM + 1 
END DO 
NUM = NUM - 1 
CLOSE(8) 
RETURN 
END 
* SUBROUTINE HEADER(FILENAME,OUT) 
CHARACTER*8 FILENAME 
INTEGER OUT 
J = INDEX(FILENAME,' ') 
WRITE(OUT,lOO)FILENAME(l:J-1) 
62 
100 FORMAT(lX,'THE FOLLOWING OUTPUT IS FROM FILE ',A) 
RETURN 
* 
* 
* 
END 
SUBROUTINE SORTER(IN) 
REAL*8 IN(20),TEMP 
INTEGER PASS 
LOGICAL NOTORDERED 
NOTORDERED = .TRUE. 
PASS = 1 
DO WHILE(PASS.LE.19.AND.NOTORDERED) 
NOTORDERED = .FALSE. 
DO I = 1,20-PASS 
IF(IN(I).GT.IN(I+l))THEN 
TEMP = IN(I) 
IN(I) = IN(I+l) 
IN(I+l) = TEMP 
NOTORDERED = .TRUE. 
END IF 
END DO 
PASS = PASS + 1 
END DO 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE CALCULATE(OUT,PASS,X,Y,N,DELTA,DELTI) 
REAL*8 DELTA,X(O:N) ,Y(N),ALPHA(O:N),BETA(O:N) 
REAL*8 PSI(O:N),TOTPSI(O:N),Z,ZI,DELTI 
INTEGER OUT,N,PASS 
CHARACTER*30 MESSAGE 
LOGICAL RULEl,RULE2 
Z = DBLE(N) 
RULE! = .TRUE. 
RULE2 = .TRUE. 
DO WHILE(DELTA.GT.O.AND.RULE1.AND.RULE2) 
DO I = O,N-1 
ZI = DBLE(I) 
ALPHA(I) = (Y(I+l)-X(I))*(DELTA*(l.DO- ZI/Z)) 
END DO 
ALPHA(N) = O.DO 
BETA(O) = O.DO 
DO I = l,N 
ZI = DBLE(I) 
BETA(I) = (Y(I)- X(I))*(l.DO/Z + DELTA*((ZI-l.DO)/Z 
1. DO)) 
* 
END DO 
DO I = O,N 
PSI(I) = ALPHA(I) + BETA(I) 
END DO 
DO I = 1,N 
TOTPSI(I) = O.DO 
DO J = 1,I 
TOTPSI(I) = TOTPSI(I) + PSI(J) 
END DO 
IF(TOTPSI(I) .LT.O)THEN 
MESSAGE = 'RULE 1 FAILED ' 
RULE1 = .FALSE. 
END IF 
END DO 
DO I = 1,N 
TOTPSI(I) = O.DO 
DO J = 1,I 
TOTPSI(I) = TOTPSI(I) + PSI(J) - ALPHA(J) 
END DO 
IF(TOTPSI(I) .LT.O)THEN 
MESSAGE = 'RULE 2 FAILED ' 
RULE2 = .FALSE. 
END IF 
END DO 
DELTA = DELTA - DELTI 
END DO 
DELTA = DELTA + 2*DELTI 
MESSAGE = 'BOTH RULES HOLD AT DELTA = 
CALL OUTPUT(OUT,PASS,DELTA,MESSAGE) 
RETURN 
END 
SUBROUTINE OUTPUT(OUT,PASS,DELT,MESSAGE) 
REAL*8 DELT 
INTEGER OUT,PASS 
CHARACTER*30 MESSAGE 
WRITE(OUT,100)PASS,MESSAGE,DELT 
RETURN 
100 FORMAT('O',I4,2X,A,F8.4,) 
END 
* 
* 
INTEGER*4 FUNCTION GET DEVICE() 
WRITE(6,*) 'ENTER THE DESIRE OUTPUT DEVICE ' 
WRITE(6,*) 'ENTER 2 FOR PA PRINTER ' 
WRITE(6,*) 'ENTER 3 FOR SCIENCE PRINTER ' 
WRITE(6,*) 'ENTER 6 FOR TERMINAL ' 
WRITE(6,*) 'PLEASE ENTER 2, 3, OR 6 :' 
READ(S,*)GET_DEVICE 
RETURN 
END 
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SUBROUTINE CONTINUE 
CHARACTER*3 RESPONSE 
10 WRITE(6,*) 'DO YOU WISH TO GO AGAIN? ' 
READ(S,' (A) ')RESPONSE 
IF(RESPONSE.EQ.'Y'.OR.RESPONSE.EQ.'YES')THEN 
RETURN 
ELSEIF(RESPONSE.EQ.'y'.OR.RESPONSE.EQ.'yes')THEN 
RETURN 
ELSEIF(RESPONSE.EQ.'N'.OR.RESPONSE.EQ.'NO')THEN 
STOP 
ELSEIF(RESPONSE.EQ.'n'.OR.RESPONSE.EQ.'no')THEN 
STOP 
ELSE 
WRITE(6,*) 'PLEASE ENTER YES OR NO ' 
WRITE(6,*) 
GOTO 10 
END IF 
END 
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